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We consider ﬁscal and monetary policy interactions in a monetary union
under monetary leadership, when the common central bank is concerned with the
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model to investigate the policy-mix problem under diﬀerent regimes of non-
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We ﬁnd that ﬁscal policy is unambiguously countercyclical, a feature that is
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1 Introduction
This paper considers strategic interactions between ﬁscal and monetary policy in a
monetary union. Countries participating in a monetary union, like the Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe, give up their currency and delegate monetary
policy to a common central bank. The independent common central bank sets union-
wide policy targets and uses the common nominal interest rate to accomplish them
and stabilize the aggregate economy in response to potential shocks. The conventional
wisdom that permeates the design of monetary unions, at least until the emergence of
the ongoing crisis in the euro zone, has been that monetary union does not necessarily
require centralized ﬁscal policy and participant countries use their ﬁscal policies to
stabilize their domestic economy.
The above general framework has been used as a platform to consider analytically
a number of policy design issues. Some researchers focus on the role of the shocks;
common aggregate shocks versus idiosyncratic shocks, or asymmetric shocks, but with
aggregate eﬀects. Others examine the policymaker’s targets relatively to their long-
run equilibrium values, thus dealing with time-inconsistency issues or consider the
strategic patterns of the common central bank and the decentralized ﬁscal authorities
(e.g., leadership versus simultaneous moves). In this paper we cope with the policy-
mix problem in a monetary union, focusing on whether the common monetary policy
and the ﬁscal policy are in conﬂict relative to the business cycle. This approach follows
(Andersen, 2008) who suggests that a conﬂict of this type emerges if, for example,
one policy is expansionary and the other is restrictive.
We use a model that assumes identical but highly interdependent economies through
traditional structural (trade) links and monetary policy implementation. We consider
country-speciﬁc shocks that have aggregate eﬀects focusing on the case of monetary
leadership. More importantly, we incorporate the monetary union’s aggregate ﬁscal
stance in the central bank’s loss function. The ongoing crisis in Europe reveals that in
the absence of a centralized ﬁscal policy the common central bank cannot ignore ﬁscal
developments in the countries that participate in the monetary union. The central
bank’s concern about the monetary union’s aggregate ﬁscal stance gives rise to some
interesting results, especially under monetary leadership.
The Treaty of Maastricht includes an explicit ’no-bail-out’ clause but the
unsustainable levels of public debt in EMU member-countries have undermined the
ﬁnancial markets’ conﬁdence to existing policy framework. Early enough many
researchers voiced their concern that the Euro area needs a preventive procedure
to avoid such an emergency (e.g., Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2004). Policymaking in
the euro zone has been conducted under the principle that the ﬁscal stance of the
EMU member nations should not be a primary concern of the common central bank.
In this model, we consider the policy implications of a common central bank that
put weight on aggregate ﬁscal stance under monetary leadership. This central bank
takes into account the ﬁscal authorities’ countercyclical reactions to shocks. Under
this set of assumptions the common central bank emerges as less hard-nosed. We
G. Chortareas, C. Mavrodimitrakis
CEJEME 3: 1-24 (2011)
2Fiscal Policies and Monetary Leadership :::
use this framework to examine policy interactions in the cases of decentralized ﬁscal
authorities, ﬁscal policy cooperation, and enforced policy cooperation.
The next section provides a selective review of the literature on policy interactions
in monetary unions and Section 3 presents the model. Sections 4 and 5 analyze
decentralized ﬁscal policy and ﬁscal policy cooperation respectively. Section 6 presents
monetary policy, and thus provides ﬁnal equilibrium solutions under both regimes.
Section 7 deals with optimal policy, whereas sections 8 and 9 examine the enforced
cooperation case; section 8 presents the monetary union’s trustee problem, whereas
section 9 focuses on monetary policy. Finally, section 10 concludes.
2 Review of the Literature
Given that an extensive literature on ﬁscal-monetary policy interactions in monetary
unions exists we provide only an eclectic survey of the relevant research in this
section. Policy interactions can be analyzed from many diﬀerent perspectives, and this
paper considers short-run stabilization issues of country-speciﬁc shocks in a monetary
union, thus abstracting from important long-run ﬁscal policy issues, such as debt
sustainability. The main focus of this paper is on the policy-mix problem in a
monetary union and the resulting interaction between centralized monetary policy
and decentralized ﬁscal policies.
A monetary union implies absence of monetary policy autonomy and thus, ﬁscal
policy’s role can be upgraded in the stabilization of country-speciﬁc shocks. In
addition a possible failure of market mechanisms in a monetary union further
enhances the potential role of ﬁscal policy. For example, Beetsma and Debrun
(2004), highlight the absence of adjustment mechanisms or cross-country risk-sharing
schemes. According to the traditional optimum currency area criterion, posed by
Mundell (1961), there is no need to develop policies for country-speciﬁc shocks when
signiﬁcant factor mobility exists. The EMU, however, cannot be regarded as an
optimum currency area, especially with regard to labor mobility as Baldwin and
Wyplosz (2004) suggest.
Beetsma and Debrun (2004), distinguish the policy-mix problem in a monetary union
between a ’horizontal’ coordination problem and a ’vertical’ coordination problem.
The former corresponds to ﬁscal policy coordination and it is a problem across
governments in a monetary union, whereas the latter refers to the coordination
between monetary and ﬁscal policies, arising from the interaction between the common
central bank and the ﬁscal authorities. In general, the policy-mix problem arises
when whichever of the above coordination problems results in a conﬂict between
the two policies relative to the business cycle situation (Andersen, 2008). In other
words, the resulting equilibrium corresponds to one policy arm (ﬁscal/monetary)
being expansionary, whereas the other (monetary/ﬁscal) being restrictive.
Early literature of short-run stabilization focused on the time-inconsistency problem
emphasizing of the implications of ﬁscal policy for central bank’s conservativeness
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(e.g., Dixit, 2001; Dixit and Lambertini, 2001; 2003). This research uses the
typical Barro-Gordon (1983) model, extended to incorporate ﬁscal policy in the form
of a production subsidy, and examines policy interactions under conﬂicting goals
between monetary and ﬁscal authorities. The common central bank incorporates
two types of conservativeness, namely weight conservativeness (Rogoﬀ, 1985) and
target conservativeness (Svensson, 1997). The ﬁrst one corresponds to more weight
on inﬂation stabilization and less on output stabilization than society, whereas the
second corresponds to lower output and inﬂation targets than the socially optimal
ones. Both types of conservativeness can ﬁght the inﬂation-bias problem in a Barro-
Gordon framework (Walsh, 2003).
The main focus of this line of research has been on policy interactions under
commitment and discretion, and under diﬀerent assumptions about the sequencing
of the game. Some standardized results include that agreement between the common
central bank and the governments on the optimal levels of output and inﬂation,
allows achieving the desired goals regardless of the sequencing of the game, the
relative importance of goals, or any cooperation among them. Therefore, it is more
important to reach an agreement over the desired goals than to appoint a conservative
central banker (see Dixit and Lambertini, 2001). Moreover under policy interactions,
a conservative central banker may make things worse. For example, Dixit and
Lambertini (2003) show how ﬁscal discretion can destroy monetary commitment.
Even when the analysis is conﬁned to models that conveniently assume time-consistent
policies a number of modelling choices have to be made when considering policy
interactions in a monetary union. The assumption of identical countries is typical
and as the consideration of heterogeneity in the context of the policy-mix problem
makes can make the solution intractable. In addition countries become interconnected
or not via trade or ﬁnancial links, the objectives across policy authorities may diﬀer,
and, alternative ways of sequencing the game may exist.
Lambertini and Rovelli (2004) use a New Keynesian framework (Clarida, Gali, Gertler
(1999); Gali (2008)) that incorporates ﬁscal policy where both the nominal interest
rate and government spending are perfect substitutes in the stabilization of shocks.
In this static two-country monetary union model the two countries are assumed to
be identical and no interconnections between them exist. They can be viewed as
identical islands under a common monetary policy, as in Blinder and Mankiw (1984).
The common central bank is concerned with aggregate inﬂation and the volatility
of the interest rate, whereas the decentralized ﬁscal authorities are concerned with
the output gap and the deviations of the balanced budget. The two authorities act
simultaneously giving rise to Nash equilibrium outcomes but nevertheless a ’vertical’
policy-mix problem arises.
Another spate of papers adopt the assumption that the national ﬁscal authorities
are not directly concerned with inﬂation, but, apart from the output gap, they are
also concerned with their ﬁscal stance (Gatti and Wijnbergen, 2002; Beetsma and
Bovenberg, 2005; Uhlig, 2003). Diﬀerent approaches exist regarding the sequencing of
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policymakers’ moves reﬂecting the diﬀerent views about the institutional framework
that best describes the monetary union. For example, Uhlig (2003), Beetsma and
Debrun (2004), and Buti and Van den Noord (2004) argue for ﬁscal leadership.
Other authors, however, argue for simultaneous moves or monetary leadership;
Kirsanova, Stehn, Vines (2005), and Hughes Hallet (2005) respectively. Their main
argument is that decentralized ﬁscal authorities are too many to act as leaders in
EMU. Furthermore, Kirsanova, Stehn, Vines (2005) argue that the ﬁscal leadership
framework might be appropriate only if ﬁscal authorities can cooperate with each
other.
A key question emerges as to whether ﬁscal coordination leads to improved policy
outcomes, or it enhances the ’vertical’ coordination problem. Andersen (2008)
examines the policy-mix problem arising under ﬁscal leadership, following Buti,
Roeger, In’t (2001). He considers identical countries with important interconnections,
time-consistent policies, and national ﬁscal authorities that are concerned about
deviations of output and government spending, whereas the common central bank
cares about aggregate output and inﬂation deviations. The fact that monetary
policy is known to the national ﬁscal authorities favors the argument for ﬁscal
leadership. Although discretionary policies are analyzed, monetary policy is eﬀectively
committed, and this is clear to the ﬁscal authorities.
Andersen (2008) provides a positive analysis examining the policy-mix problem in
the context of a monetary union. The normative analysis of the paper considers the
optimal assignment of tasks between authorities. A key ﬁnding is that in the face of
aggregate shocks, ﬁscal authorities underestimate the monetary reaction, resulting
in excessively countercyclical ﬁscal policies, whereas in the case of idiosyncratic
shocks, the monetary response is overestimated, and ﬁscal policy is insuﬃciently
countercyclical. Further decentralization worsens the problem in the case of aggregate
shocks, whereas it diminishes the problem under idiosyncratic shocks. Last but not
least, ﬂexible inﬂation targeting can overcome some of the problems of aggregate
shocks.
3 A Baseline Model
We consider a monetary union which consists of i identical countries (i = 1;2) which
are interconnected via traditional trade links and monetary policy. The monetary
union, however, is a closed economy, that is no interconnections exist with countries
outside the union. We consider the case where one country, say country 1, faces
a demand or supply side shock with aggregate eﬀects and the union central bank
must react to stabilize the monetary union’s economy. We use a static two-country
monetary union model, which is a modiﬁcation of Andersen’s (2008) model. The
non-policy block for each country consists of a Phillips curve (PC) and an aggregate
demand (AD) equation. This model is consistent with a model that emerges from
a micro-founded model which incorporates monopolistic competition in product and
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labor markets, along with sticky wages. The PC and AD equations for country 1 are,
1 = !yy1 + !gg1   "1 (1)
y1 =  ri    (1   ) + yy + gg1 + u1: (2)
All variables are in logs, apart from the nominal interest rate, and are considered
as deviations from long-run equilibrium. The ﬁscal instrument, g, can be treated
as a deviation from the balanced budget. In addition to its eﬀect on output
demand, the ﬁscal instrument has a direct eﬀect on inﬂation, !g, which can be either
positive or negative. Fiscal expansions ﬁnanced by value-added and excise taxes
generate inﬂationary pressures, but it is also possible that tax increases lead to wage
moderation, or they can be interpreted as production subsidies (see Andersen, 2008).
In general, we assume that the total eﬀect of the ﬁscal instrument on both output
demand and inﬂation is positive, so that @i
@gi = !g + !y 
@yi
@gi = !g + !yg > 0, and
@yi
@gi = g     @i
@gi = g   !g > 0.
The second term in the AD equation is the terms-of-trade eﬀect, capturing the
structural aspect of interdependence; higher prices of domestic products shift domestic
demand to foreign products. All the parameters in the AD are positive. Finally, we
consider two types of i.i.d shocks. In particular, country 1 has to cope with either a
pure demand shock that increases aggregate demand, or a pure supply shock which
reduces inﬂation when it is positive, like a technology improvement. Finally for every





2 (x1 + x2).
Turning now to country 2, the PC and AD are:
2 = !yy2 + !gg2 (3)
y2 =  ri    (2   ) + yy + gg2: (4)
After aggregation, we can represent the union-wide non-policy block as















Our objective is to investigate the policy-mix problem in the monetary union that
arises from the interaction between the common central bank and the decentralized
ﬁscal authorities under monetary leadership. The case of ﬁscal leadership is
thoroughly analyzed by Andersen (2008) who considers a credible monetary policy
with clearly deﬁned objectives and preferences that are eﬃciently communicated to
the public. Thus, the (national) ﬁscal authorities can infer the central bank’s reaction
function. Andersen (2008) assumes that the common central bank is the follower, and
the decentralized ﬁscal authorities are the leaders. Of course the monetary leadership
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case, which could possibly best describe the existing institutional arrangement of
EMU, would be another interesting scenario to consider. In that case the common
central bank plays ﬁrst, taking into account ﬁscal authorities’ reaction, even though its
leadership is considered weak (Hughes Hallett, 2005). Monetary leadership involves
a Stackelberg equilibrium, while the decentralized ﬁscal authorities make decisions
simultaneously, involving a Nash equilibrium among them.
The loss functions of the common central bank (denoted by subscript M) and the


















Both ﬁscal and monetary authorities seek to minimize deviations of their concerned
variables from long-run equilibrium. Thus, we assume that time-inconsistency
problems do not arise. In particular, we assume that the decentralized ﬁscal
authorities are concerned with the output gap and the deviation from the balanced
budget for their own country, whereas the common central bank is concerned with
output gap, balanced budget, and inﬂation in the monetary union. Our main focus
is on the ﬁscal stance and on its weight by authorities. As in Andersen (2008), we
include each country’s ﬁscal stance in their loss functions. In the context of the EMU
this reﬂects the constraints implied by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which
requires that the ﬁscal stance must be on average neutral, gi = 0, so that departures
from a balanced budget should be only small and temporary (Lambertini and Rovelli,
2004).
The hypothesis that the common central bank is also concerned with average ﬁscal
stance in the union, leads to the introduction of the aggregate ﬁscal stance in
the monetary union as an argument in the common central bank’s loss function.
The rationale is the same as with that of the (SGP), i.e., that the accumulation
of excessive debt in the union member countries may create pressures for the
central bank to shift focus away from its price stability and output stabilization
objectives. The concern for the aggregate ﬁscal stance coupled with the assumption of
monetary leadership, introduces some new perspectives in both vertical and horizontal
coordination problems. Under monetary leadership, the common central bank is
constrained by a direct link between the two instruments, (i.e., aggregate ﬁscal
stance and the nominal interest rate), as it knows that the ﬁscal authorities will
react to the interest rate. This reaction is expected to be positive, as a rise in
the nominal interest rate is expected to lower demand, and ﬁscal authorities raise
government spending in order to boost demand. This is the source of the policy-mix
problem; a restrictive monetary policy leads to an expansionary ﬁscal policy. Thus,
under monetary leadership, the common central bank needs to take into account this
channel, which might make the decision over the weight of the average ﬁscal stance
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non-trivial.
In addition, a coordination problem among the decentralized ﬁscal authorities, apart
from the standard policy-mix problem, might also arise. To examine this possibility we
consider the ﬁscal authorities’ cooperation over ﬁscal policy and treat the coalition’s








Each ﬁscal authority chooses its own instrument in order to minimize the aggregate
loss function (9). Andersen (2008) shows that in the case of aggregate common
shocks, the coordination problem arises because ﬁscal policy is more countercyclical
under decentralized ﬁscal authorities as compared to ﬁscal cooperation, and ﬁscal
policy emerges as unambiguously procyclical. Fiscal expansions that increase inﬂation
lead to output contraction, and vice versa. At the country level, however, the usual
aggregate demand eﬀects of ﬁscal policy emerge, which also determine the relative
outputs of the countries. This is the source of the coordination problem and the
main conclusion is that this problem worsens with further decentralization, while
the introduction of ﬂexible inﬂation targeting, can moderated it. Flexible inﬂation
targeting implies that the common central bank should be also concerned with union-
wide output gap along with inﬂation, but with a weight less than that of the ﬁscal
authorities.
Our model considers the coordination problems under monetary leadership, when the
common central bank is also concerned with the average ﬁscal stance of the union. In
addition to the above questions, we go one step further, and introduce a third player
in the game who acts as the monetary union’s political trustee. The typical framework
of ﬁscal monetary policy interactions assumes that the principal responsible for policy
design at the monetary union level is solely the union central bank. This is clearly
insuﬃcient given the current consensus on what the mandate of the central bank
should be and given the experience of the EMU in Europe. In order to capture
existing debates about enforced ﬁscal cooperation in the EMU (and in particular in the
European Commission) we introduce another authority, the European Commission
(EC), who sets guidelines for ﬁscal policy in each country, and thus acts as a principal
to the ECB. In particular, we assume that EC enforces both decentralized ﬁscal
authorities to choose their ﬁscal stance by minimizing the following loss function




Lambertini and Rovelli (2004) consider a similar problem where the EC minimizes
a loss function that incorporates the cooperative ﬁscal authorities’ loss function and
the loss function of the common central bank in a straightforward additive way. They
assume that society’s preferences coincide with those of the EC. In our model, the
EC aims to enforce cooperation among the decentralized ﬁscal authorities and cares
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about union-wide inﬂation with the same weight as the common central bank does.
Finally, we can consider optimal policy by letting the society’s preferences
corresponding to a loss function that incorporates the common central bank’s loss
function with the one from the ﬁscal cooperation case, that is:
LS = LM + LF: (11)
Alternatively, this problem can be thought as one of ﬁscal and monetary policy
cooperation.
4 Decentralized Fiscal Policies
The timing of the model has the shocks realized ﬁrst and then policies responding
to them. Under monetary leadership, decentralized ﬁscal authorities decide on the
domestic ﬁscal stance after the common central bank has set the nominal interest
rate. Each ﬁscal authority decides simultaneously its action with the other so that
they do not consider each other’s decision problem. Thus, in the game between the
common central bank and the decentralized ﬁscal authorities, each ﬁscal authority is
the follower. We solve the model using backward induction and taking the aggregate












i = !yyi + !ggi   "i
yi =  ri    (i   ) + yy + ggi + ui;
where shocks are only for country 1. The ﬁrst order condition for this problem is
@LFi
@gi
= 0 ) gi =  nc










Equation (12) represents the ﬁscal rule of each country in the case of decentralized
ﬁscal authorities. It gives the reaction of ﬁscal authorities to any given output
deviation from long-run equilibrium. The positive reaction parameter nc
g in this
ﬁscal rule implies that ﬁscal policy is unambiguously countercyclical. For example, if
domestic output is less than its equilibrium level, the ﬁscal authority’s reaction would
be to expand the ﬁscal stance in order to boost demand. The reaction parameter
depends positively on the impact of domestic ﬁscal policy on domestic output, after
taking into account its impact upon inﬂation and the corresponding result through
the terms-of-trade eﬀect. The larger this impact, the more countercyclical the ﬁscal
policy is. Furthermore, it depends on the relative weight that decentralized ﬁscal
authorities place upon output versus its ﬁscal stance. If the weight on output is
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larger than the one upon the ﬁscal stance ﬁscal policy becomes more countercyclical.
After aggregation, we get
g =  nc
g y : FRnc (13)
This is the aggregate ﬁscal rule for the non-cooperative case that becomes a constraint
to the common central bank. The central bank must incorporate this decision rule
in its decision about setting the interest rate. It knows that the nominal interest
rate aﬀects aggregate output and output per country, thus the decentralized ﬁscal
authorities would respond to it. Knowing how changes in the countries’ ﬁscal stance
aﬀect aggregate output and inﬂation, it also knows how the given decision aﬀects the
ﬁnal outcome at the monetary union level. These aggregate equilibrium solutions for
the ﬁscal stance, output and inﬂation are functions of the nominal interest rate and
shocks.
Substituting for aggregate output (eq. 6) into the union-wide ﬁscal rule (eq. 13) and












1   y + gnc
g
u1 (14)
When y < 1 + gnc
g , an increase in the interest rate results in expansion of the
aggregate ﬁscal stance in the monetary union. Furthermore, if y < 1, this impact
will be higher the more countercyclical ﬁscal policies are. Apart from the change in
the interest rate, the aggregate ﬁscal stance reacts directly to a demand shock that
hits country 1. Under the same circumstances, a positive demand shock makes the
aggregate ﬁscal stance to decrease.
To obtain the solutions for output and inﬂation, we ﬁrst substitute the previous
solution for the aggregate ﬁscal stance (eq. 14) in the union-wide ﬁscal rule (eq. 13)
to obtain equilibrium output, and then we incorporate both solutions to the union-
wide PC (eq. 5). The resulting expressions are:
ync =  
1



























The equilibrium output falls in response to nominal interest rate increases. In
the absence of a demand shock, monetary policy prevails over ﬁscal policy under
decentralized ﬁscal authorities. This impact is naturally lower the higher the ﬁscal
reaction parameter is. Equilibrium inﬂation decreases when nominal interest rate
increases if !y > !gnc
g , suggesting that output’s direct eﬀect upon inﬂation is higher
than the eﬀect of aggregate ﬁscal stance upon inﬂation through ﬁscal reaction. This
adds more credit to monetary policy prevalence and occurs under !g > 0. We discuss
the importance of the !g in what follows. Moreover, if !g + g!y > !gy, then the
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previous impact decreases with the increase of the ﬁscal reaction parameter, in other
words with more countercyclical ﬁscal policy.
Turning to the country-speciﬁc equilibrium output and inﬂation, we start from
country 1 and substitute for aggregate output (6) into the country’s output demand
equation (2), to obtain relative output as:




Similarly, relative inﬂation emerges as:




Using relative inﬂation into relative output we have:
y1   y =
g   !g
1 + !y







In the absence of shocks, output in country 1 can only diﬀer from the union-wide
output if ﬁscal policy is diﬀerent. Using country’s 1 ﬁscal rule, we obtain the
equilibrium relative output under decentralized ﬁscal authorities,
ync




by ("1 + u1)





Knowing the union-wide output under non-cooperation (eq. 11), we can compute
output for country 1 as a function of the two shocks and the interest rate. Output in
country 1 is negatively related to the interest rate, by the same parameter as aggregate
output.
Using the same procedure for country 2 we obtain
ync




by ("1 + u1)





Subtracting the output of country 2 from the output of country 1 under non-




by ("1 + u1)





Equation (19) expresses the output diﬀerential in the two countries in terms of
parameters and shocks. If the shocks are positive, the output gap in country 1
is unambiguously higher than the output gap in country 2, and vice versa. In
addition, for higher ﬁscal reaction parameters, which imply more countercyclical ﬁscal
policies, this diﬀerence decreases. Output diﬀerences across countries do not depend
on monetary policy.
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5 Cooperation among Fiscal Authorities
Under centralized ﬁscal policy, ﬁscal authorities cooperate with each other by choosing



































subject to each country’s PC and AD equations (1-4), and to the aggregate relations.
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to country’s 1 ﬁscal stance emerges as:
@LF
@g1














 (!g + !yg)y2 : FRc
1:
This ﬁscal rule shows that ﬁscal policy under cooperation is unambiguously
countercyclical, as it is in the non-cooperative case. The ﬁrst order condition with















 (!g + !yg)y1 : FRnc
2 :
The diﬀerence between the cooperative case and the non-cooperative one is that
under cooperation, each ﬁscal authority reacts with the same sign not only to its own
output, but also to the other ﬁscal authority’s output. To illustrate this point, we








[y (g   !g) +  (!g + !yg)]y2: (20)
The parameter in brackets in front of country’s 2 output captures the impact of
country’s 1 ﬁscal stance on country’s 2 output, and it simultaneously expresses
the interconnections between the two countries. The ﬁrst term corresponds to the
aggregate demand channel, while the second term to the terms-of-trade channel.
After aggregation, we obtain
gc =  c











bg (!g + !yg). This is the union-wide ﬁscal rule for
the cooperative case and shows that ﬁscal policy is unambiguously countercyclical as
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Under ﬁscal cooperation, the ﬁscal authorities understand the interconnections
between the two countries. Thus, a coordination problem in ﬁscal policies arises
under decentralized ﬁscal authorities. Moreover, and as a consequence of monetary
leadership, this ﬁscal coordination problem does not depend on monetary policy.
We follow a similar procedure as for the non-cooperative case above to obtain solutions
for the ﬁscal stance, output and inﬂation, at the union-wide and country-speciﬁc level.














































It is obvious that with c
g > nc
g , the negative impact of monetary policy on output is
lower under cooperation, and so is the impact of the demand shock. Thus, the results
of the non-cooperative case emerge under the cooperative case as well, but they are
milder. The same reasoning holds for inﬂation.
Finally, we compute equilibrium solutions for each country, reporting only those
for output gap (We do not report detailed results for other variables due to space
limitations but they are available upon request):
yc















2by (!g + !yg)
 (26)
yc















2by (!g + !yg)
 (27)
The diﬀerence between output gaps in each country at equilibrium with respect to


















2by (!g + !yg)
 (28)
Equation (28) diﬀers from equation (19) in that its sign cannot be determined, as it
depends on the parameters. Thus, a positive shock either on the demand or on the
supply side of country’s 1 economy may lead to an output gap in country 1 which is
lower than that in country 2. Under ﬁscal cooperation, ﬁscal authorities incorporate
the aggregate demand eﬀect and the terms-of-trade eﬀect caused by the ﬁscal reaction
to the shock. If these eﬀects are stronger, country 1 may end up with a negative output
gap after a positive shock.
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6 Monetary Policy Leadership
Assigning leadership to the common central bank implies that it takes into account
the ﬁscal authorities’ decision rules. Thus, we can exploit the equilibrium solutions
for union-wide ﬁscal stance, output and inﬂation under both non-cooperative and
cooperative ﬁscal policy with respect to monetary policy (eq. 14, 15, 16, and 23, 24,































1   y + gg
u1   1
2"1
where g corresponds to the ﬁscal reaction parameter and is speciﬁed as nc
g for the
decentralized ﬁscal authorities and c
g for ﬁscal cooperation. The ﬁrst order condition
for this problem is
@LM
@i






Equation (29) corresponds to the monetary rule of the common central bank and
shows the way the common central bank reacts to changes in inﬂation. As the
denominator is always positive, we focus on the sign of the nominator which shows
the impact of union-wide output to inﬂation after taking into account the reaction of
the union-wide ﬁscal stance to output and its impact on inﬂation.
The common central bank manipulates the uses the nominal interest rate in the
typical way. For example, when inﬂation increases the common central bank raises
the nominal interest rate. For this policy to be successful, however, the central bank
must know how output aﬀects inﬂation. A straightforward eﬀect exists of course
from output decreases/increases to inﬂation decreases/increases. The central bank,
however, must also consider the ﬁscal reaction to a decrease in output. As ﬁscal
policy is countercyclical under both regimes, the decrease in output leads to a ﬁscal
expansion by the ﬁscal reaction parameter, which adds to inﬂation, if !g > 0. Thus,
the ﬁnal impact of output upon inﬂation is not known.
In particular, let !g > 0. If !y > !gg, then the direct impact of output upon
inﬂation prevails and monetary policy is countercyclical too; an increase in inﬂation
makes the common central bank to increase the interest rate so as to reduce output,
and ﬁnally, as its direct impact prevails to the one through ﬁscal reaction, reduces
inﬂation. If, however, !y < !gg, then the ﬁscal reaction prevails, which renders
monetary policy procyclical. An increase in inﬂation generated by a negative supply
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shock in country 1 makes the common central bank to lower the interest rate so as to
increase output. This happens because the central bank understands that the ﬁscal
authorities will react to this output increase by shrinking the union-wide ﬁscal stance.
This directly decreases output, and ﬁnally inﬂation decreases as well. Last but not
least, if !g < 0, then monetary policy is unambiguously countercyclical.
Computing the ﬁnal equilibrium solutions for union-wide output and inﬂation requires
solving the monetary rule (eq. 29) with respect to the interest rate, using equations














 (1   y + gg)
1 +  (!y   !gg)
"1: (30)
This is the interest rate rule for the common central bank. It shows the sign and
magnitude of the monetary instrument’s reaction to the shocks. Again, the parameter
nc
g corresponds to the decentralized ﬁscal authorities, while c
g to ﬁscal cooperation.
At this point instead of proceeding directly with an analysis of the previous interest
rate rule, we ﬁrst provide the corresponding solutions for the union–wide ﬁscal stance,
output, and inﬂation.
Thus, by substituting for the interest rate solution into the three constraints of the




















1 +  (!y   !gg)
"1: (33)
These are the ﬁnal solutions for the monetary leadership game of one common central
bank against two ﬁscal authorities corresponding to two identical countries that form
a monetary union, when the two countries are interconnected via monetary policy
and a terms-of-trade eﬀect, and when country 1 is hit by either demand or supply
side shocks. Using nc
g and nc
 we obtain the solutions for the case of decentralized
ﬁscal authorities, while using c
g and c
 we obtain the solutions for the cooperative
case. These solutions are consistent with Andersen’s (2008) results, with the obvious
diﬀerence that the reaction terms are functions of diﬀerent parameters, as our model
considers monetary leadership.
What are the implications of these ﬁndings? In the ﬁrst stage, we examine a positive
pure demand shock that hits country 1, u1 and has aggregate eﬀects equal to 1
2u1.
These aggregate eﬀects increase output in the monetary union, which in turn leads to
an increase in inﬂation. Given the common central bank’s loss function, the central
bank reacts to this development by increasing the nominal interest rate by 1
r. This
reduces aggregate output and thus inﬂation. The above equilibrium solutions for the
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aggregate ﬁscal stance, output and inﬂation do not depend on the demand shock.
Under a (positive or negative) pure demand shock monetary policy carries out the
task of fully stabilizing the aggregate eﬀects of the shock. Thus, the ﬁscal authorities
do not respond to demand shocks, coordination problems do not arise, and aggregate
output and inﬂation equal their long-run equilibrium levels.
In the second stage, we examine a negative pure supply shock that increases inﬂation
in country 1, "1 < 0. The aggregate eﬀects of this shock are 1
2"1, which increase
inﬂation in the monetary union and the common central bank reacts according to
its monetary rule. Under either !g > 0 and !y > !gg or !g < 0, the common
central bank raises the nominal interest rate to reduce aggregate output leading
also to a reduction in each country’s output. The ﬁscal authorities then reacting
in unambiguously countercyclical way expand their ﬁscal stance under both the non-
cooperative and cooperative regimes. Thus, in equilibrium the aggregate the ﬁscal
stance increases, aggregate output decreases and inﬂation increases. Given the strong
countercyclical nature of ﬁscal policies under ﬁscal cooperation, however, this result
is more profound under the non-cooperative regime.
A substantial remark can be made at this point about inﬂation. All equilibrium
solutions (31-33) have the same denominator, which is unambiguously positive.
Equation (33) reveals that the parameter of the shock is always negative, regardless
of parameter values and the nature of ﬁscal cooperation. Thus, in equilibrium
a positive/negative supply shock reduces/increases inﬂation. When !g > 0 but
!y < !gg, monetary policy is procyclical. Negative supply shocks induce the
common central bank to reduce the nominal interest rate, which also leads to a
decreasing aggregate ﬁscal stance. In equilibrium, aggregate output exceeds its log-
run equilibrium value.
To summarize our results, we observe that a policy-mix problem exists, in the sense
that when monetary policy is expansionary, ﬁscal policy is restrictive, and vice versa.
Secondly, aggregate output in equilibrium is determined by monetary policy as it
exceeds its long-run equilibrium level when monetary policy is expansionary and
falls short of it when monetary policy is restrictive. Thirdly, equilibrium inﬂation
is always negatively related to the supply shock. Negative/positive supply shocks
lead to inﬂation exceeding/falling short of its long-run equilibrium value. In complete
contrast with aggregate output, inﬂation is determined by ﬁscal policy. The preceding
analysis, of course, holds for y < 1 + gg.
The monetary rule of the common central bank (eq. 29) reveals that both weights
on union-wide output and ﬁscal stance have no impact on the sign of the reaction
parameter,  and do not determine countercyclicality/procyclicality. Both play
an important role, however, in determining how strongly monetary policy reacts
to inﬂation. Under strict inﬂation targeting, where the common central bank
is only concerned with minimizing inﬂation deviations from long-run equilibrium
(ay = ag = 0) monetary policy is successful in taming inﬂation. By contrast, when
the common central bank is concerned with more variables, its reaction to inﬂation
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weakens. For any given output weight, the central bank’s concern with aggregate
ﬁscal stance weakens its reaction to inﬂation. The stronger this concern, the weaker
the monetary reaction. In this case the central bank has three targets, but only one
instrument.
Finally, we examine the implications of the common central bank’s ﬁscal concern
parameter for stabilization policy. Considering the variances of output and inﬂation
(eq. 32 and 33) at equilibrium, it is straightforward that
@[V ar(y)]
@ag < 0 and
@[V ar()]
@ag > 0. That is, while the central bank’s ﬁscal concern parameter facilitates
output stabilization at the union level, at the same time it destabilizes union-wide
inﬂation. This result pertains to supply shocks only, as under demand shocks the
economy at the union level is fully stabilized. Moreover, by considering the variance
of the aggregate ﬁscal stance, one can easily see that
@[V ar(g)]
@ag < 0. Thus, the existence
of the common central bank’s concern on the aggregate ﬁscal stance works for output
and central budgets stabilization for the monetary union as a whole, but at the expense
of higher inﬂation.
7 Optimal Policy Assignment
To compute optimal policy we assume a benevolent dictator who chooses both policy
instruments simultaneously to minimize society’s loss function. The last includes
the loss functions of the common central bank’s and of the ﬁscal authorities’ under



























subject to each country’s PC and AD equations (1-4), and to the aggregate relations.
The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to aggregate ﬁscal stance and the nominal
interest rate, delivers a monetary and a ﬁscal policy rule as follows:
y =  S
 : MRS (34)
g = S











gby (1   y + !y)
ag (1   y)
.
The monetary reaction parameter, S
, is deﬁnitely positive, so that optimal monetary
policy is unambiguously countercyclical. The central bank’s weight upon the
aggregate ﬁscal stance does not aﬀect the magnitude of its reaction parameter. By
contrast, the weights that the common central bank and the decentralized ﬁscal
authorities place upon output are negatively related to the reaction parameter. If
society increases its concern on output the monetary reaction parameter declines.
The ﬁscal reaction parameter can be either positive or negative. For !g > 0, if y < 1
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optimal ﬁscal policy must be procyclical, while if y > 1 is undetermined. Under
!g < 0, the result is indeterminate in the ﬁrst case, while optimal ﬁscal policy is
countercyclical in the second case. The ﬁscal reaction parameter decreases with the
increase of central bank’s weight upon the union-wide ﬁscal stance. Under monetary
leadership, the above results reveal a completely inappropriate policy mix, in the sense
that monetary policy is less countercyclical and ﬁscal policy is too countercyclical,
especially under ﬁscal cooperation.
To characterize the optimal union-wide output and inﬂation we start by using the
optimal ﬁscal rule (eq. 35) for the aggregate ﬁscal stance in the aggregate PC (eq. 5),
and then use the optimal monetary rule (eq. 34) to substitute for aggregate output.
Using the optimal monetary rule for aggregate output’s optimal solution and solving
























When ﬁscal policy is procyclical (!g > 0 and S
g > 0) aggregate output and
aggregate inﬂation in equilibrium are positively and negatively related to supply
shocks respectively.
8 Enforced Fiscal Cooperation: The Monetary
Union’s Trustee Problem
Under a scheme of enforced ﬁscal cooperation a new player emerges, namely
the "trustee" of the monetary union, which in the context of the EMU can be
approximated by the European Commission (EC). To solve the EC’s optimization
problem we observe that both decentralized ﬁscal authorities choose their respective
ﬁscal stance to minimize equation (10) subject to their PC and AD equations (1-4),























































Note that this is similar to country’s 1 ﬁscal rule under ﬁscal cooperation, FRc
1, but
with an additional term that captures EC’s concern about inﬂation. By symmetry,
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The above expression corresponds to the aggregate ﬁscal rule in the monetary union
under enforced ﬁscal cooperation by the EC. A new trade-oﬀ emerges between
aggregate ﬁscal stance and inﬂation, as a result of ﬁscal authorities’ enforced concern
about inﬂation. The inﬂation parameter is deﬁnitely positive and captures the
reaction of aggregate ﬁscal stance to aggregate inﬂation variations. This relation
is negative, as an increase in inﬂation generates a decrease in the aggregate ﬁscal
stance. The reaction parameter depends positively upon the eﬀect of each country’s
change in its ﬁscal stance upon aggregate inﬂation, and negatively upon its weight
on its ﬁscal stance. The higher the concern for its ﬁscal stance relative to aggregate
inﬂation, the lower the inﬂation reaction parameter will be.
To obtain the ﬁnal aggregate ﬁscal rule in the monetary union under EC’s enforcement









g + !y (!g + !yg)
bg + !g (!g + !yg)
.
The main diﬀerence with the ﬁscal rule for the standard cooperative case is that
ﬁscal policy must also respond directly to a possible supply shock in country 1. This
response is positive, as a positive supply shock reduces inﬂation and the aggregate
ﬁscal stance must increase. The ﬁscal reaction parameter, i.e., the parameter of
aggregate output, is always positive provided that !g > 0. That is, ﬁscal policy
under EC’s enforcement is unambiguously countercyclical too.
To compare the magnitude of the ﬁscal reaction parameter under enforcement with





g + !y (!g + !yg)












As the sign of the above diﬀerence is not clear, we cannot say under which of these
two cases ﬁscal policy is more countercyclical. The answer, however, depends on the
sign of a familiar parameter, namely !y  !gc
g. This parameter shows the impact of
union-wide output to inﬂation after taking into account the reaction of the union-wide
ﬁscal stance to output, under standard ﬁscal cooperation, and its impact on inﬂation.
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Under !g < 0, the ﬁscal reaction parameter for the enforced case is higher than the
one for the standard cooperative case if and only if bg > j!gj(!g + !yg). If the
direct eﬀect of the ﬁscal stance upon inﬂation is negative and ﬁscal authorities care
enough about their ﬁscal stance, then ﬁscal policy under EC’s enforcement will be
more countercyclical. If the direct impact of the ﬁscal stance on inﬂation is positive
(!g > 0) two distinct cases emerge. When !y > !gc
g, the direct impact of output
upon inﬂation prevails over the one through ﬁscal reaction and ﬁscal policy is more
countercyclical than for the standard cooperative case. Alternatively when !y <
!gc
g, ﬁscal reaction prevails, resulting in a less countercyclical ﬁscal policy with
respect to EC’s enforcement. Finally, the higher the weight that decentralized ﬁscal
authorities place upon their ﬁscal stance, the more likely ﬁrst case becomes. In
summary, ﬁscal policy is less countercyclical if the impact of its ﬁscal reaction upon
inﬂation is important.
The solutions to the union-wide ﬁscal stance, output and inﬂation, as well as for each
country, can be computed following the same procedure as for the cooperative case.
The solutions are symmetric on the nominal interest rate and on the demand shock










































































1   y + gec
g
 "1 + 1
2!g (!g + !yg)"1
(44)
The analysis with respect to the nominal interest rate and the demand shock is
analogous to both the non-cooperative and the standard cooperative cases with the
only diﬀerence being the supply shock. The solutions for the aggregate ﬁscal stance
and for the output gap are directly related to the supply shock. Under the assumptions
in section 4, that y < 1+gec
g and !g > 0, the supply shock is positively related to
the aggregate ﬁscal stance. A positive supply shock that causes aggregate inﬂation to
decrease makes each country’s output to decrease as well, triggering an expansionary
aggregate ﬁscal stance. The impact of the supply shock upon aggregate output is
more complicated. Under the same circumstances, it also depends upon the impact
of aggregate output upon country-speciﬁc output, after taking into account the impact
of the country-speciﬁc ﬁscal stance on output through the ﬁscal reaction. If the direct
impact dominates (y > gec
g ), then the output gap responds negatively to a positive
supply shock, and vice versa.
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9 Monetary Policy Under Enforced Fiscal
Cooperation
As equations (42)-(44) reveal, after the monetary policy is set the equilibrium solutions
under enforced ﬁscal cooperation are not symmetric to those under no cooperation
and standard cooperation. The common central bank incorporates in its framework
the above equations. Being the leader, it minimizes its loss function (eq. 7) with
respect to the nominal interest rate and subject to equations (42)-(44), producing the
ﬁrst order condition:
yec =  ec
















This is the monetary rule in the case of enforced ﬁscal cooperation. Under ec
g > 0,
and !g > 0, the crucial parameter for understanding the monetary reaction is again
!y !gec
g . In all cases considered ﬁscal policy is countercyclical and monetary policy
depends on how the interest rate ﬁnally aﬀects inﬂation after the ﬁscal reaction. This
holds for non-cooperation, for the benchmark cooperative solution, and for enforced
cooperation. If the direct eﬀect of output on inﬂation dominates (!y > !gec
g ) then
monetary policy is countercyclical. In contrast, if the indirect eﬀect through the ﬁscal
reaction dominates (!y < !gec
g ) monetary policy is procyclical. But this result does
not hold strictly under enforced ﬁscal cooperation.
For monetary policy to be procyclical, the nominator of the monetary reaction
parameter has to be negative. In other words, the condition required is
!gec





The second term on the right-hand side of the above inequality captures the impact
of the ﬁscal reaction to inﬂation multiplied by the ﬁscal reaction parameter and the
weight that the common central bank attaches to the aggregate ﬁscal stance. This
parameter shows the positive impact of ﬁscal stance upon inﬂation, whereas the
parameter on the left hand side of the inequality captures the prevailing negative
impact. In general, enforced ﬁscal cooperation imposes an additional constraint on
monetary policy’s procyclicality.
























Comparing these policy outcomes with those under the non-cooperative or the
standard cooperative cases (i.e., equations 32 and 33) reveals that they are not
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symmetric. The nominator includes an additional parameter that captures the impact
of the ﬁscal reaction to inﬂation, !g (!g + !yg). If this impact is less than unity, and
under !g > 0, the analysis for the sign of the above solutions are exactly symmetric to
the previous cases, whereas if it is greater than unity, the previous analysis is reversed.
The impact of the common central bank’s ﬁscal concern parameter on the monetary











and its stabilization role cannot be easily determined. When this impact is positive,
under !y > !gec
g , the ﬁscal concern parameter facilitates inﬂation versus output
stabilization, and vice versa. When that impact is negative, this result reverses.
10 Conclusion
We analyze a game of monetary leadership in a monetary union when the common
central bank is concerned explicitly about the ﬁscal position of the monetary union’s
member countries. Our analysis produces a number of results that can be summarized
as follows. Given that under a policy leadership game the policy of the follower
institution is unambiguously countercyclical, in our monetary leadership model
ﬁscal policy is unambiguously countercyclical. Moreover, cooperative ﬁscal policy
emerges with relatively more pronounced countercyclical features as compared to
non-cooperative policy. Monetary policy can be either countercyclical or procyclical,
depending on whether the direct eﬀect of output upon inﬂation or the indirect eﬀect
through ﬁscal reaction dominates. Monetary policy is countercyclical in the ﬁrst
case whereas it is procyclical in the latter case, which is more likely to obtain under
ﬁscal cooperation. The equilibrium solutions for output and inﬂation depend on
the policies’ reaction parameters while demand shocks are fully stabilized at the
union-wide level. Equilibrium inﬂation is always negatively related to the supply
shocks. Optimal policy, that is ﬁscal and monetary cooperation, requires monetary
policy to be countercyclical and ﬁscal policy to be procyclical. Under enforced ﬁscal
cooperation, ﬁscal policy responds positively and in a direct fashion to the supply side
shock while ﬁscal policy is countercyclical under speciﬁc conditions. Under enforced
ﬁscal cooperation, monetary policy can be either countercyclical or procyclical, as in
the cases of non-cooperation or cooperation, although a countercyclical "bias" exists.
The monetary reaction parameter is negatively related to the central bank’s weight
on the aggregate ﬁscal stance. It emerges that, under supply shocks, an increase
in this weight increases inﬂation in equilibrium while it decreases the output gap.
This is a feature of the decentralized and the standard cooperation cases as well. The
central bank’s concern about the aggregate ﬁscal stance facilitates output stabilization
and central budget stabilization, but comes at the expense of inﬂation stabilization.
Finally, under enforced ﬁscal cooperation, the result of a change in the common central
bank’s weight on the aggregate ﬁscal stance upon the monetary reaction parameter
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is ambiguous, depending on parameter values, and thus its stabilization role cannot
be clearly determined.
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